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The Concept of Democracy and the European
Convention on Human Rights
Dr. Joseph Zand*

Abstract
The European Convention on Human Rights, for the most part,
guarantees civil and political rights.1 It is a unique international instrument that provides what is widely regarded as the most effective
trans-national judicial process for complaints brought by citizens and
organizations against their respective governments.2 The aim of this
article is to contribute to the continuing debate on the notion of democracy according to the European Convention on Human Rights.
Not only has the Convention been a standard-setter in Europe, but it
is also a source of inspiration in promotion of democracy and democratic values for other regions of the world. With this in mind, the article considers the appropriate elements of the Convention which directly concerns democratic values. To that end, the article critically
examines the relevant Articles of the Convention on the notion of
democracy as well as on the jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights. Furthermore, in recent decades, the Convention has
ma de a telling contribution in relatıon to transition to peace and
democracy in the former communist Eastern European states.
KEY WORDS:
European Convention on Human Rights, European Court of
Human rights and the Concept of democracy.
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Faculty of Law, Inonu University, Malatya, Turkey; Joseph.zand@inonu.edu.tr.
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I. Introduction
The heinous atrocities committed in the course of the World
War II, produced a flurry of aspirational and binding documents and
treaties, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
Genocide Convention, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).3 However, European Convention on Human Rights (Convention) is undoubtedly the most effective human rights instrument ever devised. Since its enactment, the
Convention has been a standard-setting text for transition to peace

3.

A Short History of Human Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS HERE AND NOW (Nancy Flowers
ed.), http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/edumat/hreduseries/hereandnow/Part-1/short-history.htm
(last visited Feb. 8, 2017).
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and democracy throughout Europe.4 It is worth noting that the Council of Europe is no longer limited to the Western European states.5
Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold
War, geographic and cultural influence of the Convention has progressed eastward and now encompasses all of the former Soviet Eastern Bloc states.6 In fact, at present, forty-seven countries representing 800 million citizens have now recognized the right of their
citizens to bring cases against them at the European Court of Human
Rights (Court).7 The Convention is also becoming increasingly a
source of legal inspiration in other legal jurisdictions. The Convention was created as a standard-setter and upholder of liberal democracy in Europe, and ever since the issue of democracy has been one of
its inseparable fundamental features.8 Therefore, the Convention was
4.
5.

6.

7.
8.

Klass and Others v. Germany, App. No. 5029/71, 59 Eur. Ct. H.R. 22 (1978). Soering
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, 88 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1989).
Under Statute of the Council of Europe 5 U.N.T.S. 103, a member state ‘must accept
the principles of the rule of law and the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction
of human rights and fundamental freedoms.’ The significance of the Convention’s role
in giving meaning to these obligations has been highlighted in recent years by the fact
that becoming a party to the Convention is now a political obligation of membership of
the Council of Europe: EUR. CONS. ASS., Honouring Commitments Entered Into by
Member States When Joining the Council of Europe, 14th Sess., Doc. No. 7037 (1994),
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTMLEN.asp?fileid=16442&lang=en.
For example, Russia which ratified the Convention in May 1998 and Georgia which
only joined the Council of Europe in April 1999 and ratified the Convention in June
1999. Council of Europe, Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature
Sep. 21, 1970 C.E.T.S. No. 14 (http://assembly.coe.int). See generally James A.
Sweeney, Divergence and Diversity in Post-Communist European Human Rights Cases, 21 CONN. J. OF INT’L L. 1 (2005).
CT.
OF
HUM.
RTS.,
The
Court
in
Brief,
EUR.
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Court_in_brief_ENG.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2017).
Indeed, in the preamble to the Convention, a clear link is established between the
Convention and liberal democracy by stating that the maintenance and furtherance of
human rights and fundamental freedoms can only be safeguarded by an effective liberal democracy and a common understanding and observance of human rights. Furthermore, the preamble goes on to assert that European countries have a common heritage
of political tradition, ideals, freedom and the rule of law, which are the principles of
liberal democracy and the underlying values of the Convention itself. See generally
Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. OF
INT’L L. 46 (1992); see also Christina M. Cerna, Universal Democracy: An International Legal Right or the Pipe Dream of the West?, 27 N. Y. U. J. OF INT’L L. AND POL.
289, 295 (1995); STEVEN WHEATLEY, THE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010).
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designed to maintain and promote the ideals and values of a demodemocratic society.9
The ‘Travaux Preparatoires’ of the Convention unequivocally
states that it was created to “prevent rebirth of totalitarianism”, to
“defend our people from dictatorship”, and to “strengthen the
resistance in all our countries against insidious attempts to undermine
our way of life”.10 The Convention goes on to impress upon the
citizens of member countries of the Council of Europe that it would
“define and guarantee the political basis of this association of
European nations” and “ensure that member states of the Council of
Europe are democratic and remain democratic” while providing a
“code of law for the democracies.”11
The European Convention on Human Rights was a direct
product of the immediate post-war era to unify Europe.12 The
Convention was a reaction to the serious human rights abuses that
Europe had witnessed in the course of the Second World War.13 But
“it can also be viewed in the context of the much longer struggle to
secure respect for personal autonomy, the inherent dignity of persons,
and equality of all men and women.”14
The preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights
(Convention) asserts that European countries have a common
heritage of political tradition, ideals, freedom and the rule of law,
which are the principles of liberal democracy and the underlying

9.
10.
11.
12.

13.
14.

Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, App. Nos.: 5095/71, 5920/72 and
5926/72, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 27 (1976) HUDOC, http://www.echr.coe.int.
Council of Europe, Collected Edition of the “Travaux préparatoires”of the European
Convention on Human Rights, vol. 1, 30, 192; vol. 5, 332 (1975-1985).
Id. at 4, 50, 60.
The main reason for the Convention was partly the need to elaborate on the Council of
Europe membership obligations and commitments. See European Convention of Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, 231 U.N.T.S. 221, C.E.T.S. 5, U.K.T.S. 71,
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf (entered into force 3 September 1953, Council of Europe, at 28 October 2013, hereinafter cited as ‘Convention’).
See generally DJ HARRIS, ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, 1 (3d ed. 2014) (For the framers, democracy was given a vivid significance, in
contrast to the recent experience of “fascism, hitlerism, and communism.”).
CLARE OVEY & ROBIN WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (5th
ed. 2010); Susan Marks, The European Convention on Human Rights and its ‘Democratic Society’, in BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 209-10 (1995).
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values of the Convention itself.15 Hence, it is fair to say that the
Convention was designed to maintain and promote the ideals and
values of a democratic society.16 Moreover, the Convention was to
achieve all this by providing a collective guarantee, if not of all
applicable rights and freedoms, then at least of those considered
“essential for a democratic way of life.”17
Since its creation, the European Court of Human Rights (Court)
has had to preside over many cases in which the question of
democracy and its concept within the framework of the Convention
as well as the rights of anti-democratic actors in a liberal democracy
have been dealt with.18 This article will deal with relevant articles of
the Convention, which encapsulate the concept of democracy through
the case-law of the Court and how its jurisprudence has evolved in
this regard since the 1950s. In doing so, this article will look into the
Courts conception of democracy in such areas as the essential
requirements of any political system based on liberal democracy.
II. The Notion of Democracy and the Convention
The drafters of the Convention devoted a prominent role to
promotion of pluralism and democracy in Western European states
by incorporating the idea of democracy as a cornerstone to protect the
right of the individual.19 The notion of a ‘democratic society’
permeates the entire European Convention system. In the preamble
to the 1949 statute of the Council of Europe, the participating states
reaffirm “their devotion to the spiritual and moral values which are
common heritage of their peoples and the true source of individual
15.

16.
17.
18.
19.

In the preamble to the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention), a clear
link is established between the Convention and liberal democracy by stating that the
maintenance and furtherance of human rights and fundamental freedoms can only be
safeguarded by an effective liberal democracy as well as a common understanding and
observance of human rights. Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No: 14038/88, Series
A-161, para 88.
Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark, App. Nos.: 5095/71, 5920/72 and
5926/72 Series A-23, p. 27.
Supra note 10, 43-4.
See generally infra note 19.
SUMMIT
COUNCIL
OF
EUROPE,
Warsaw
Declaration,
WARSAW
www.coe.int/t/dcr/summit/20050517_decl_
varsovie_en.asp (The current mandate of the Council of Europe was established at a
summit which took place in Warsaw in 2005); See also Bowman v. United Kingdom,
26 E.H.R.R. 1 (1998).
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freedom, political liberty and the rule of law, principles which form
the basis of all genuine democracy.”20 The Strasbourg organs have
emphasized the point that “democracy does not simply mean that the
views of the majority must always prevail” but, “a balance must be
achieved which ensures fair and proper treatment of minorities and
avoid abuse of a dominant position.”21
In recent decades, the Court has turned its attention to the
fundamental link between the substantive rights guaranteed by the
Convention and the concept and existence of democracy within the
member states.22 There is no doubt that the Court considers qualities
such as pluralism, tolerance, broadmindedness, equality, liberty and
encouraging self-fulfilment as important characteristics of any
functioning democracy.23 On the question of the relationship
between democracy and the Convention the Grand Chamber in its
unanimous decision in the case of the United Communist Party of
Turkey v. Turkey held:
That is apparent, firstly, from the preamble to the Convention,
which establishes a very clear connection between the Convention
and democracy by stating that the maintenance and further realisation
of human rights and fundamental freedoms are best ensured on the
one hand by an effective political democracy and on the other by a
common understanding and observance of human rights.24
Moreover, in its Grand Chamber decision in Gorzelik and others
v Poland the ECtHR defined pluralism as ‘the genuine recognition of,
and respect for, diversity and dynamics of cultural conditions, ethnic

20.
21.
22.
23.

24.

Statute of the Council of Europe, EUROPEAN TREATY SERIES - NO. 1,
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommon
SearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680306052.
Sorensen v. Denmark and Rasmussen v. Denmark, Apps. 52562/99 and 52620/99,
11January 2006 [GC], (2008) 46 EHRR 752, para. 58; see also the older case of
Young, James and Webster v. UK, 13 August 1981, ECHR Series A, No. 44, para. 63.
Sweeney, J.A., The European Court of Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era: Universality in Transition, Routledge, 2012, p. 19.
Oberschlik v. Austria, No. 11662/85, Series A, No. 204, 23.5.91, para. 58; see also
Ovey, and White, European Convention on Human Rights, op. cit., p. 326; Merrills,
J.G., “The Development of International law by the European Court of Human
Rights”, Manchester U.P., 1993, especially chapter 8, ‘Human Rights and Democratic
Values’.
The United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, (1998) 26 E.H.R.R. 121.
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and cultural identities, religious beliefs, artistic, literary and socioeconomic ideas and concepts.’25
III. Democratic Rights and the Convention
The centrality of democracy to the Convention system does not
mean that the precise form of democracy ımplied by the convention
particularly clear.26
Nonetheless, the Court has consistently
maintained that at the heart of the notion of democracy is based on
the full participation of all the citizens of the high contracting
parties.27 Participatory democracy includes ‘the formal conception of
majority rule which concerns the method of decision-making and,
over and above this requirement, also demand that the majority
respect the equal worth of all citizens.28 Therefore, democracy is the
only political model that the Convention aims for and finds
compatible with it.29 In a democracy, however, it is assumed that
limitations on individual rights and freedoms for the common good or
to protect more compelling rights of others would be justified.30
As a democracy is based on the equal worth of individuals, at
least certain human rights must be protected. In particular, political
rights, such freedom of expression, the right to vote, and the freedom
of assembly are understood as vital for a functioning democracy.
Democracy must also be understood to require the protection of other
human rights, such as the right to family life and correspondence and
the right to religion. Therefore, according to the Court Articles 8, 9,
10 and 11 of the Convention encapsulate the concept of democracy
have common features which may require interference with the use of
the rights set out by these articles.31
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Gorzelik and others v Poland, App. 44158/98, 17 February 2004, para. 92.
Sweeney, J.A., The European Court of Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era, op.
cit., p. 148.
Id.
G. Lautenbach, The Concept of the Rule of Law and the European Court of Human
Rights, Oxford U.P., 2013, p. 65.
O’Connell, R.O., “Towards a Stronger Concept of Democracy in the Strasbourg Convention”, European Human Rights Law Review (2006) 281.
See generally Higgins, R., “Derogations under Human Rights Treaties”, (1978) 48
British Yearbook of International law; Marks, “the European Convention on Human
Rights and its “Democratic Society”“, op. cit., p. 212.
Zdanoka v. Latvia, Appl. No. 58278/00 (2006) ¶115; see also G Van de Schyff, The
Concept of Democracy as an Element of the European Convention, 38 THE COMP. &
INT’L LAW J. OF S. AFR. (2005).

201

2017

The Concept of Democracy

These interferences must be evaluated by the benchmark of
what is “necessary in a democratic society.”32 The only type of
necessity to justify interference can only derive from a “democratic
society.”33 If a restriction on democracy is prescribed by law, the
Court then would consider whether the law, or rather the way in
which it was applied, is “necessary in a democratic society” for any
of the reasons outlined in the Articles.34 Hence, the Court has
developed the approach that states have a “margin of appreciation” in
deciding whether a particular restriction on a right is required in the
given circumstance.35 In the case of Handyside the Court stated:
By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital
forces of their countries, state authorities are in principle in a better
position than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact
content of these requirement as well as on the ‘necessity’ of a
‘restriction’ or ‘penalty’ to meet them.36
The Court also goes on to say:
Whilst the adjective ‘necessary’ . . .is not synonymous with
“indispensable”, neither has it the flexibility of such expressions as
“admissible”, “ordinary”, “useful”, “reasonable” or “desirable”.
Nevertheless, it is for the national authorities to make the initial
assessment of the reality of the pressing social need implied by the
notion of “necessary in this context.37
IV. The Notion of Democracy and Relevant Articles of the
Convention
As noted briefly above, through its case-law the Court has
identified certain provisions of the Convention, which clearly
encapsulate the concept of a democratic society38 On this point it has
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Conor Gearty, Democracy and Human Rights in the European Court of Human
Rights: A Critical Appraisal (2000) 51 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 381, 388.
G.H. FOX, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (2000).
IAN LOVELAND, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 593 (Oxford U.P. 6th ed. 2012).
See generally YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHSHI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND
THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR (Interesentia
2002).
Handyside v. United Kingdom (No. 24), 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) 1, 17-19 (1976).
Id. at58.
Austria v. Italy, App. No. 788/60, 4 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R 116, 138 (Eur. Comm’n
on H.R.).
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been noted that, “in relation to the Convention proper, the Court’s
conception of democracy is only elucidated incidentally-through
consideration of the democratic rights contained in the convention.”39
The substantive rights that are considered to comprise the concept of
democracy are easily identified.40 Express reference to the concept of
democracy may be seen in the second paragraphs of Articles 8-11 of
the Convention as well as Articles 2(3) and (4) of the Fourth
Protocol.41
Each of the Articles 8-11 set out a Convention right in the first
paragraph, and set out possible qualifications to the right in their
second paragraph as a means of right-restrictive measures.42 In spite
of some “differences of detail in the nature of the limitations arising
under each article, there is sufficient commonality of approach to
justify a collective consideration of these limitations before
examining the substantive rights protected under each of these
articles.”43 The Court has explicated that “there is undoubtedly a link
between all of these provisions, namely the need to guarantee respect
for pluralism of opinion in a democratic society through the exercise
of civic and political freedom.”44
Initially, in regards to the concept of democracy, the Court
considered Articles 10 protecting “Freedom of Expression” and
Article 11 “freedom of Assembly and association” as the more
relevant articles to the concept of democracy and democratic
process.45 This transpires in four ways, “through judgements on
Articles 10 and 11, which guarantee freedom of expression and
association respectively, on merits of applications and through
Article 17 in decisions on admissibility, also relevant is the rather
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Paul Harvey, Militant Democracy and the European Convention on Human Rights, 3
EUROPEAN LAW REVIEW 407, 412 (2004).
JAMES A. SWEENEY, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE POST-COLD
WAR ERA: UNIVERSALITY IN TRANSITION 151 (2013).
See HARRIS, O’BOYLE & WARBRICK, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, 341-60 (1995).
Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, App. No. 50963/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2002).
JACOBS & WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 308 (Clare Ovey
& Robin C.A. White eds., 4th ed. 2006). See also STEVEN GREER, THE EXCEPTIONS TO
ARTICLES 8 TO 11 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1997).
Zdanoka v. Latvia, App. No. 58278/00, Eur. Ct. H.R., 36 (2006).
Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1976); Lingens v.
Austria, App. No. 9815/82, Eur. Ct. H.R., 13 (1986); Oberschlik v. Austria, No.
11662/85, Eur. Ct. H.R.,17 (1991).
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weaker protection offered by Article 3 of Additional Protocol No.1
(hereinafter Article 3 of Protocol No. 1), which obligates member
states to hold free elections.”46 Article 17 of the Convention sets out
prohibition from the use of Convention rights from implying: “Any
right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at
their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the
Convention.”47 Therefore, Article 17 prevents member states from
abusing the Convention rights, curtailing the rights and freedoms of
others, in other words, providing a safety mechanism specifically
designed to prohibit totalitarian movements from using human rights
as a means of furthering their cause.48
Nonetheless, it has been noticed elsewhere that freedom of
expression under Article 10 and Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, which
provides the guarantee of free elections held at reasonable intervals
are the two provisions of the Convention, “embodied the
characteristics of a democratic society.”49 The Court has stressed that
“eminence of freedom of expression in a democratic society of which
it is one of the essential foundations and one of the most basic
conditions for its progress and of each individual’s self-fulfilment.”50
In recent decades, Article 8 which protects “private and family life,
home and correspondence,” and Article 9 which protects “freedom of
religion and belief,” have also been considered by the Court in
relation to the general concept of democracy.51

46.
47.
48.

49.
50.
51.

Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, App. No. 30985/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000).
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Apr. 11,
1950.
Vona v. Hungary, App. No. 35943/10, (2013), para. 34 (The Court has observed that
“the general purpose of Article 17 is to prevent totalitarian groups from exploiting in
their own interests the principles enunciated by the Convention”); Communist Party
(KPD) v. Germany, No. 250/57, (1957), Yearbook 1, p. 222, para. 86-89.
ALISTAIR MOWBRAY, THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY, 704 (1999).
DELFI AS v. Estonia, No. 64569/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 78, (2013).
See Halford v. United Kingdom, 20605/92 Eur. Ct. H. R. ¶ 24; Leander v. Sweden,
9248/81 Eur. Ct. H. R. ¶ 9; M.D. EVANS, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN EUROPE 282-284 (2008) (The Court has considered these articles particularly
in relation to the issue of personal correspondence).
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IV.A. Article 8: Right to Respect for Private and Family Life
Article 8 of the Convention protects four connected rights.52
Those include the right to private and family life and the right to
respect for home and correspondence.53 Each one of these rights is
“autonomous” and the Court is not constrained by any national
interpretation of them.54 The Court consistently has refrained from
providing a comprehensive definition of private life.55 Article 12 of
the Convention complements Article 8, guaranteeing the right to
marry and find a family.56 In addition, the member states of the
Council of Europe have decided to reinforce the equality of spouses
in family life by adopting Article 5 of the Seventh Protocol.57
Article 8 places on states the obligation to respect a wide range
of personal interest.58 Article 8 secures not only negative but also
positive aspects of the rights in question.59 The Court has spelt out
the dual nature of Article 8 rights: “Although the object of Article 8
is essentially that of protecting the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it may involve the authorities’
52.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

58.
59.

IVANA ROAGNA, PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR PRIVATE AND FAMILY LIFE
UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2012) (According to Article 8
of the Convention: “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life,
his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or
the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”).
See generally IVANA ROAGNA, PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR PRIVATE AND
FAMILY LIFE UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2012) (regarding
Article 8 of the Convention).
DAVID HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 516
(3rd ed. 2014).
Niemietz v. Germany, 13710/88 Eur. Ct. H. R. ¶ 29.
See Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 30141/04 Eur. Ct. H. R. ¶ 49 (Article 12 of the Convention states that “men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to
found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.”).
Protocol No. 7 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, E.T.S. 117, Nov. 1, 1988 (Article 5 of the Seventh Protocol states that “spouses shall enjoy equality of rights and responsibilities of a private
law character between then, and in their relations with their children, as to marriage,
during marriage, and in the event of its dissolution. This article shall not prevent states
from taking such measures as are necessary in the interest of the children”.).
DAVID HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 516
(3rd ed. 2014).
Marckx v. Belgium, 6833/74 Eur. Ct. H. R. ¶ 31.
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adopting measures designed to secure respect for private life and
home even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between
themselves.”60 On one hand, the state in question is obliged not to
interfere with the domain of private and family life, home, or
correspondence. On the other, the state is required to take particular
necessary measures to realize the effective enjoyment of these rights.
IV.B Article 8 and Personal Correspondence
When the Court finds a particular measure to be in
“interference” with the rights embodied under the first paragraph of
Article 8, it must consider whether such interference may be justified
by the conditions laid down in the second paragraph.61 The standard
formula developed in the case law is common to other personal
freedoms set out in Articles 9 – 11. A violation of Article 8 can only
be justified providing it is “in accordance with the law,” has a
“legitimate aim,” and is “necessary in a democratic society.”62
The issue of interference with correspondence by national
authorities has presented a new challenge to the court in recent
decades. Correspondence includes postal correspondence, telephone
calls, emails, and text messages.63 According to the court, such
interferences include opening, reading, censoring or deleting
correspondence violates Article 8 of the Convention.
The
controversial issues of surveillance of communication and a
prisoner’s right to correspondence have recently been under sharp
scrutiny.64

60.
61.
62.
63.

64.

See Dees v. Hungary, 2345/06 Eur. Ct. H. R. ¶ 21; Airey v. Ireland, 6289/73 Eur. Ct.
H. R. ¶ 32; X and Y v. Netherlands, 8978/80 Eur. Ct. H. R. ¶ 23.
BERNADETTE RAINEY, ELIZABETH WICKS & CLARE OVEY, JACOBS, WHITE & OVEY:
The European Convention on Human Rights 310-312 (2014).
DAVID HARRIS, MICHAEL O’BOYLE, EDWARDS BATES & CARLA BUCKLEY, Law of the
European Convention on Human Rights 344 (2014).
Malone v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8691/79, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1984) (for interception
of telephone calls).; Halfords v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 20605/92, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(1997) (for email).; Golders v United Kingdom, Appl. No. 4451/70, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(1975) (for post).
Kennedy v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 26839/05 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010).; see
Klamecki v. Poland (no. 2), Appl. No. 31583/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 144 (2003); Kucera
v. Slovakia, Appl. No. 48666/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 127 (2007); see also Mowbray, A.,
European Convention on Human Rights, Oxford U.P. at 561-589 (For a review of the
relevant case law).
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Therefore, in order to curb member state’s discretionary powers,
the Strasbourg organs have required that the law in question must be
accessible and foreseeable.65 In particular, the “foreseeability test”
provides a crucial safeguard for the citizen by requiring the law to be
“sufficiently clear” and precise and by giving “adequate indication”
as to the circumstances in which and conditions on which any secret
surveillance or interceptive measures are employed.66 Another
implication of the foreseeability test is the requirement that adequate
safeguard against possible abuses must be provided clearly
demonstrating the extent of the authorities’ discretion and defining
the circumstances in which it is to be exercised.67 In other areas of
complaints under Article 8, by contrast, the first standard has rarely
been contested, and the Convention bodies have focused their
examination on the third standard; “necessary in a democratic
society.”68
The best example of this judicial oversight by the court was
when it presided over a series of cases involving British citizens
alleging illegal interception of their correspondence.69 The Court
held that due to the fact that there was no domestic law to regulate
such activities there had been a breach of Article 8 by the United
Kingdom.70 These rulings prompted the British government to fill
this lacuna by enacting the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act
2000.71 As a consequence of this Act, the telephone tapping civil
cases in the United Kingdom are now brought under Article 8 of the
Convention as in the most recent case, brought by a number of
British politicians and celebrities against the Metropolitan Police.72
They successfully argued that there was a breach of Article 8 since
the police had failed to inform them about the telephone hacking and

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 6538/74, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 56 (1979).
See Kennedy v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 26839/05, 18 May 2010, ¶ 119; see also
Klass and Others v. Germany, Appl. No. 5029/71, 6 September 1978, ¶ 33.
Michaud v. France, Appl. No. 12323/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 88, ¶ 88 (2012).
See Malone v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 8691/79, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1984); see also
Halfords v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 20605/92, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1997).
Id.
Copland v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 62617/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 41 (2001).
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, c. 23 (Eng.).
Phone hacking: Met police failed to warn victims, BBC NEWS (Feb. 7, 2012),
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-16922305.
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had failed in their duty to carry out a thorough investigation as part of
its positive duty under Article 8.73
Moreover, it is worth noting that the doctrine of margin of
appreciation plays a pivotal role in the development of Article 8 case
law providing states a certain degree of discretion particularly in
certain areas where the court is reluctant to impede the decisions
made by states in relation to issues “where a different approach is
justified by local conditions.”74 Nonetheless, in this regard, the court
has shown willingness to keep the extent of the margin of
appreciation under review through the development of its
jurisprudence.75
IV.C Article 9: Freedom of Religion and Belief
Article 9 of the Convention protects the right to freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion.76 In recent years, academic
discussion of religious freedom in Europe and its relation to the
concept of democracy has been dominated by the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights under Article 9 of the
Convention.77 Moreover, Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination)
of the Convention may be relevant to freedom of religion cases.78
Hence, the Court has reiterated that Article 9 is not simply “one of
the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believer,”
but also “a precious asset for atheists, sceptics, and the
unconcerned.”79 The right to freedom of thought, conscience, and
73.
74.
75.
76.

77.
78.
79.

Bryant & Ors., R (on the application of) v. The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2011] EWHC 1314 (Admin) (Eng.).
D.J. HARRIS, M. O’BOYLE & C. WARBRICK, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 363 (1995).
Valentino Acatrinei v. Rom., App. No. 18540/04, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. 10 (2013).
According to Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, protecting the
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion: (1) Everyone has the right to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his
religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in a community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance. (2) Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for
the protection of the rights and freedom of others.
NORMAN DOE, LAW AND RELIGION IN EUROPE 40 (2011).
SAMANTHA KNIGHTS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, MINORITIES, AND THE LAW 56 (2007).
Buscarini and Others v. San Marino, App. No. 24645/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. 8 (1999).

208

ILS Journal of International Law

Vol. V. No. II

religion is unqualified80 This includes the right to hold a religion or
belief and to change it.81 For the Article to apply, a belief must
“attain a certain a level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and
importance,” and more importantly, by the possible qualifications in
Article 9(2).82 This allows the state to interfere with the right if the
three tests in Article 9(2) are met.83 The interference must be
“prescribed by law,” have one of the legitimate aims listed in Article
9(2) and be “necessary in a democratic society.”84
Despite the importance and the extent of interests protected by
Article 9, some observers have argued that due to the cautious
approach adopted by the Court and the Commission in the early days
of the Convention, traditionally, relatively few applications were
made alleging violations of Article 9; only a small proportion of
those have given rise to successful claims.85 The case-law related to
this right is very recent, with the first judgment finding a violation of
this article only delivered in the much referred to Kokkinakis case in
1993.86
However, since then a rich and often controversial jurisprudence
has begun to develop, including two judgments on Turkish attempts
to ban the wearing of Muslim headscarves in certain higher education
establishments; the fallout from Publication of cartoons of the
Prophet Muhammad in Denmark in 2005, and the Grand Chambers
reversal of the judgment backing a challenge to the display of the
Christian crucifix in Italian state schools.87 There is no doubt that
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

RUSSELL SANDBERG, LAW AND RELIGION 82 (2011).
Id..
Campbell and Cosans v. United Kingdom, Appl. 7511/76 and 7743/76, 25 February
1982, Series A No. 48, (1982) 4 EHRR 293, para. 36.
Sandberg, R., Law and Religion, op. cit., p. 82.
Id..
Harris, O’Boyle, Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, op.
cit., p 425.
Kokiknakis v Greece, Appl. no. 14307/88, 25 May 1993, 17 EHHR 379. On the Kokkinakis case; see Evans, Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe, op. cit.,
pp. 282-84, 332-35.
Leyla Şahin v Turkey (GC), 18 March 2011, Appl. No. 30814/06) and discussed in
Altıparmak, K. & Karahanoğulları, O., “after Şahin: the Debate on Headscarves is not
Over”, European Constitutional Law Review 2 (2006) 268, McGoldrick, D., Human
Rights and Religion: the Islamic Headscarf Debate in Europe, Oxford: Hart,
2006.BBC Website, “Special Report, the Muhammad cartoon row”, 7 February 2006,
available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/4677976.stm> at 28 October
2013.Lautsi v. Italy, (GC), 18 March 2011 (Appl. No. 30814/06).

209

2017

The Concept of Democracy

Switzerland’s attempt to ban the construction of new minarets will
also give rise to some thought-provoking legal arguments.88
IV.D Democracy as a limit on restricting freedom of religion
Justifying a restriction on religion or belief, and the extent to
which it is “necessary in a democratic society,” has often been a
controversial issue.89 In line with other international human rights
instruments on religious liberty, Article 9 enshrines the rights in the
first paragraph, and provides for the possible qualifications to the
right in the second paragraph. The qualifications of Article 9 are
slightly different to the other personal freedoms since they pertain
only the manifestation of religion or belief (the forum externum),
rather than the act or state of believing itself (the forum internum).
Interpreting the scope of Article 9 (1) has been rather challenging,
and the European Commission’s decision in Arrowsmith v. United
Kingdom, that not all actions motivated by religious belief fall within
it, has been met with some criticism.90
In applying the limitations contained in Article 9 (2), the Court
has been rather sensitive to varied constitutional traditions of the
member states, notwithstanding the fact that this approach has been
criticized by certain scholars.91 The main characteristic of Article 9
in relation to this study is the extent to which the Court has
recognised a strong link between religion and a democratic society.
According to the Court, “freedom of thought, conscience and religion
is one of the foundations of a democratic society within the meaning
of the Convention.”92 In this manner, Article 9 needs to be
interpreted in light of other Convention rights, such as the Article 11,
the right of assembly and association.93 Consequently, interference
with the rights stipulated in Article 9 may be examined not only as an

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

BBC Website, “Swiss Minaret Appeal goes to European Court” (16.12.2009) available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8417076.stm> at 28 October 2013.
Harris, O’Boyle, Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, op.
cit., p. 437.
Evans, C., Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights,
Oxford U.P., 2001, p. 115.
Ibid.
Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, 26 October 2000 *Appl. No. 30985/96) para. 60; Serif
v Greece (2001) 31 EHRR 20.
Id., para. 62.
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infringement on the applicant’s own religion or beliefs, but also as an
indirect violation on the democratic fabric of society.94
Restrictions on Article 9 must comply with the conditions
specified in Article 9 (2). They must be prescribed by law and be
necessary in a democratic society in the interest of public safety, for
the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection
of the rights and freedoms of others.95 These specific “interests” are
more commonly referred to in the European jurisprudence as
“legitimate aims.”96 It is also important to note that other major
international human rights instruments adopt the same approach to
the issue of religious belief by striking a balance between the
“legitimacy” of restrictions and their “necessity” to limiting freedom
of religion.97
IV.E Article 10: Freedom of Expression
Article 10 guarantees freedom of expression, which has been
described as “one of the cardinal rights guaranteed under the
Convention.”98 This notion comprises the actual freedom of
94.

Sweeney, J.A., “Freedom of Religion and Democratic Transition”, in Buyse, A. &
Hamilton, M. (eds.), Transitional Jurisprudence and the ECHR: Justice, Politics and
Rights, Cambridge U.P., 2011, P. 105.
95. Id..
96. Id..
97. Freedom of religion is protected in all other major international and regional human
rights instruments, including Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), Article 3 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
(American Declaration), Article 12 of the American Convention on Human Rights
(ACHR) and Article 8 of the African Charter on Human People’s Rights (ACHRP).
98. According to Article 10 of the Convention:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent states from requiring the licencing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprise.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by
law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the
authority and impartiality of the judiciary. See generally Macovei, M., “Freedom of
Expression: A to Implementation of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights”, Human Rights Handbooks, No. 2, 2nd edition, 2004.
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expression, freedom of information, freedom of communication via
mass media, and specific parts of the freedom of artistic and
academic expression.99 Indeed, the marked importance of this right
and the demand for its special protection due to its close linkage to
democracy’s political process is an indispensable part of the
Convention.100 The Court has consistently maintained that states are
under obligation to ensure that private individuals can effectively
exercise their right of communication between themselves.101
Furthermore, freedom of political debate is at the very core of
the concept of democratic society, which prevails throughout the
convention.102 The Court has repeatedly reiterated that “freedom of
expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of democratic
society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each
individual’s self-fulfilment.”103 The convention has underlined the
need for transparency and accountability on the part of the high
contracting states.104 In ascertaining whether a positive obligation to
act exists in a particular situation, certain”regard must be had to the
fair balance that has to be struck between the general interest of the
community and interests of individuals.”105
The most protected class of expression has been political
expression, since the Court considers such expression as an essential
part of any effective pluralist democracy, in order to ensure respect
for fundamental human rights.106 The court has emphasised this point
forcefully that “in a democratic system, the acts or omissions of the
government must be subject to the close scrutiny not only the
99.
100.
101.

102.
103.
104.

105.
106.

Grabenwarter, C., European Convention on Human Rights: Commentary, Beck/Hart
Publishing, 2014, P. 252.
Harris, O’Boyle, Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, op.
cit., p.443.
Hertel v. Switzerland, 25 August 1998, 28 EHRR, para. 46, Report of Judgments and
Decisions 1998-VI; Steel and Morris v. United Kingdom, Appl. no. 68416/01, 15 February 2005, para. 87; and Animal Defenders International v. United Kingdom [GC],
Appl. No. 48876/08, 22 April 2013, para. 100.
Lingens v. Austria, Series A no. 103, 8 July 1986, para. 41.
Thoma v. Luxemburg, Appl. No. 38432/97, 29 June 2001.
OOO Ivpress and Others v. Russia, App. No. 33501/04, 38608/04, 35258/05 and
35618/05, 22 January 2013, para. 55; see also Council of Europe, Committee of ministers, “Declaration on freedom of political debate in the Media”, Adopted by the Committee of ministers on 12 February at the 872nd meeting of the Ministers deputies.
Available at: <https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=118995> at 28 October 2013.
Ozgur Gundem v. Turkey, Appl. No. 23144/93, 16 March 2000, para. 43.
Mowbray, European Convention on Human Rights, op. cit., p. 626.
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legislative and judicial authorities but also the press and public opinopinion.”107 This point was reiterated in the United Communist Party
of Turkey case, in which the court considered pluralism at the heart of
its conception of democracy.108 Hence, the court firmly puts the onus
on the member states as the “ultimate guarantors of the principle of
pluralism”, especially in the context of media.109
As the Court famously held in Handyside v. United Kingdom,
even opinions which “shock, offend, or disturb” should be
tolerated.110 In line with this the Court in the case of Vajnai v.
Hungary has reiterated that:
A Legal system which applies restrictions on human rights in
order to satisfy the dictates of public feelings – real or imaginary –
cannot be regarded as meeting the pressing social needs recognised in
democratic society, since the society must remain reasonable in its
judgment. To hold otherwise would mean that freedom of speech and
opinion is subjected to the heckler’s veto.111
In the recent case of Cumhuriyet Vakfi and Others v. Turkey, the
Court reiterated the importance of freedom of expression as “one of
the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic
conditions for its progress and for each individual self-fulfilment”.112
IV.E(i) Freedom of Expression and Transition to Democracy
In recent decades, both the Court and the Commission have
acknowledged that in a transition to democracy it may be legitimate
to curtail forms of speech which are very critical of the state.113 As
Judge Carrillo Salcedo in the case of Castells v. Spain observed:

107. The interest which the public may have in particular information can sometimes be so
strong as to override even a legally imposed duty of confidence. Guja v. Moldova, No.
14277/04, 12 February 2008; see also Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC], no.
29183/95, ECHR 1999-I, and Radio Twist, a.s. v. Slovakia, no. 62202/00, ECHR
2006-XV.
108. United Communist Party of Turkey, op. cit, para 43.
109. Manole and Others v. Moldova, Appl. No. 13936/02, 17 September 2009, para. 107.
110. Handyside v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 5493/72, 7 December 1976, para. 49.
111. Vajnai v. Hungary, Appl. No. 33629, 8 July 2008, para. 57.
112. Cumhuriyet Vakfi and Others v. Turkey, Appl. No. 28255/07, 8 October 2013, para.
56.
113. Buyse, A., “The Truth, the Past and the Present: Article 10 ECHR and Situations of
transition”, in Buyse, A. & Hamilton, M. (eds.), Transitional Jurisprudence and the
ECHR: Justice, Politics and Rights, Cambridge U.P., 2011, P. 132.
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In a situation where politically motivated violence poses a conconstant threat to the lives and security of the population, it is
particularly difficult to strike a balance between the requirements of
protecting freedom of expression and the imperatives of protecting
the democratic state.114
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and accession of all of
the former Soviet Bloc states in Europe to the Council of Europe, the
Court has been faced with an entirely different challenge of
transitional democracies in those states.115
Nevertheless, the
Convention “to which most central and Eastern European countries
acceded in the years immediately following the demise of communist
regimes, was a crucial signpost on the road to democracy and the rule
of law.”116 It is worth noting that such challenges were not limited to
the former Soviet Bloc states and the Court had previously faced
similar tasks in the case of Southern European states.117
Although, the process of transition does not prompt the Court to
deviate from its established jurisprudence but the Court’s judgments
on the freedom of expression are of particular salience to transitional
process.118 Therefore, the Court’s case-law has strongly adopted an
approach in which information exchange and pluralities of opinions
is of paramount importance in any democratic society, therefore,
restoring a balance between the citizens’ fundamental rights and the
state–a balance completely void in the era of authoritarian rule in the
former communist states of Eastern Europe.119

114. Concurring Opinion of Judge Carrillo Salcedo; Castells v. Spain, Appl. No. 11798/85,
8 January 1991.
115. Leuprecht, P., “Innovations in the European System of Human Rights Protection: Is
Enlargement Compatible with Reinforcement?,” 8 Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs.,
313, (1998) pp. 313-14; see also Fein, E., “Transitional Justice and Democratization in
Eastern Europe”, in May, R.A. and Hamilton, A.K. (eds.) (Un) Civil Societies, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2005, pp. 197-223.
116. Buyse, “The Truth, the Past and the Present: Article 10 ECHR and Situations of transition”, op. cit., p. 148.
117. See generally Schmitter, P., “An Introduction to Southern European Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule: Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Turkey”, in O’Donnell, G.,
Schmitter, P. and Whitehead, L. (eds.), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern
Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U.P., 1986.).
118. Buyse, “The Truth, the Past and the Present: Article 10 ECHR and Situations of transition”, op. cit., p. 148.
119. Id. at 149.
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IV.F Article 11: Freedom of Assembly and Association
Freedom of assembly and association provides protection for the
formation of collective entities by individuals for any lawful
purpose.120 Thus, political parties play a special role within the
guarantee of freedom of association due to their pivotal role in the
functioning of a democratic government.121 The Grand Chamber has
referred to ‘the primordial role played in a democratic regime by
political parties enjoying the freedoms and rights enshrined in Article
11 and also in Article 10 of the Convention.’122
Not only citizens in fledgling democracies of Eastern Europe
but also some nationals of the more established democracies in
Europe have had to rely on the Court’s jurisprudence in relation to
the rights to freedom of assembly and association (Article 11 of
Convention) and the obligation upon states to hold free elections
(Article 3, of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention).123 Article 11
protects the two distinct if sometimes connected freedoms of peaceful
assembly and association.124 In occasions, states have sought to

120. Marauhn, T., ‘General Principles’ in Ehlers, D. & Becker, U. (eds.), European Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, de Gruyter, 2007, p. 122.
121. The right to freedom of association as provided in Article 11 of the Convention reads
as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association
with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of
his interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article
shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by
members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the state.
122. Linkov v. The Czech Republic, no. 10504/03, para 34, 7 December 2006; Redfearn v.
United Kingdom, no. 47335/06, para 55, 6 November 2012.
123. Article 3, of Protocol No. 1, states: ‘the High Contracting Parties undertake to hold
free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under condition which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.’
Hamilton, M., “Transition, Political Loyalties and the Order of the State”, in Buyse, A.
& Hamilton, M. (eds.), Transitional Jurisprudence and the ECHR: Justice, Politics and
Rights, Cambridge U.P., 2011, 151-184, p. 151.
124. Harris, O’Boyle, Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, op.
cit., p.516.
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justify interference with these rights in order to foster democratic
values, in turn leading to allegations of excessive rights limitations125
In recent years, the Court has had to deal with the more practical
application of the notion of democracy in regards to freedom of
assembly and association.126 The eligibility to stand for election to a
national parliament was examined in the case of Zdanoka v Latvia,
which concerned refusal by the Latvian authorities to allow the
applicant, Mrs. Tatjana Zdanoko,127 a member of the Communist
Party of Latvia to be included on the resident’s register to stand for
the first parliamentary elections in 1993—since Latvia’s regaining
independence from the Soviet Union in 1991128
The Chamber and Grand Chamber in this case adopted entirely
different approaches to the interpretation of someone’s eligibility to
stand for election. On the one hand, in its Chamber judgment, the
Court held that the electoral restrictions by the Latvian government in
1995 had violated Mrs Zdanoka’s P 1-3 right. The Chamber felt
compelled to “adhere to the same criteria” permitted by Articles 8-11,
since “the only type of necessity capable of justifying an interference
with any of those rights is, therefore, one which may claim to
emanate from democratic society.”129 However, the Grand Chamber
held that:
Where an interference with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 is in issue
the Court should not automatically adhere to the same criteria as
those applied with regard to the interference permitted by the second
paragraphs of Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention . . . Because of the
relevance of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the institutional order of
the State, this provision is cast in very different terms from Articles 8
to 11 of the Convention . . . The standards to be applied for
125. Hamilton, “Transition, Political Loyalties and the Order of the State”, op. cit., p. 151152.
126. The general principle enounced in the case-law in this field are summarised in the
case of United communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, Appl. No.
133/1996/752/951, Judgment of 30 January 1998, paras. 42-47.
127. In February 1993 Ms Zdanoka became chairperson of the Movement for Social Justice and Equal Rights in Latvia, (Kustība par sociālo taisnīgumu un līdztiesību Latvijā), which later became a political party, Līdztiesība (“Equal rights”).
128. Zdanoka v Latvia, Appl. No. 58278/00, 16 March 2006; see also the older Judgment
in the case of Gitonas v Greece, App. No. 18747/91, Judgment of 1 July 1997, 27
EHRR 417.
129. European Convention on Human Rights art. 8-11, Nov. 4, 1950.
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establishing compliance with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 must theretherefore be considered to be less stringent than those applied under
Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention.130
Hence, the implied defense to “the institutional order of the
state’ echoes specific reference to Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.131 By
adopting this approach the Grand Chamber established a high
supervisory threshold in which case a violation would only take place
if procedural deficiencies gave rise to likely arbitrary treatment.132 It
is clear that the Grand Chamber was of the opinion that Article 3 of
Protocol No. 1 does not exclude the restrictions on electoral rights,
since it may be imposed on “an individual who has, for example
seriously abused a public position or whose conduct threatens to
undermine the rule of law or democratic foundations”.133
This approach is very much in step with Allen’s observation that
“there is reluctance to allow the Court to be used as a forum for
hearing disputes that have their origin in the pre-transitional era”
since “there is a strong, though not universal, belief within the
European Court that there is little to be gained by investigating the
stories of victim.”134 In other words, in such cases, the contracting
states are given considerable latitude to establish their constitutional
rules regarding the status of parliamentarians which inevitably would
include the criteria for disqualification.135 This would include
ensuring the independence of members of parliament as well as
electorate’s freedom of choice.136 The wide margin of appreciation
given to states is mainly because each state has historical and
political factors unique to them and the criteria would vary
accordingly.137 Nonetheless, according to Hamilton:
One apparent consequence of the more relaxed scrutiny of
Article 3 of Protocol 1 is that no assessment need be made of extant
transitional risk. This again sharpens the contrast with Articles 10 and
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Zdanoka v Latvia, Appl. No. 58278/00, 16 March 2006, para. 115(a).
Hamilton, “Transition, Political Loyalties and the Order of the State”, op. cit., p. 157.
Id.; see also Zdanoka v Latvia, op. cit., para. 107-108.
Id. atpara. 110, citing Glimmerveen and Hagenbeek v. the Netherlands (nos. 8348/78
and 8406/78, Commission decision of 11 October 1979, DR 18, p. 187).
Allen, T., “Restitution and Transitional Justice in the European Court of Human
Rights” (2007) 13(1) Columbia Journal of European Law 1, 30.
Paksas v. Lithuania, Appl. No. 34932/04, 6 January 2011, Para. 92.
Sarukhanyan v. Armenia, Appl. No. 38978/03, 27 May 2008, para. 39.
Zdanoka v Latvia (GC), op. cit., para. 119.
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11 of Convention which demand attention to the imminence of an evevidenced threat.138
However, the Court was unanimous in its decision that there had
been no violation of Article 3 of Protocol 1 by Latvia.139 Indeed, this
judgement indicates the court’s concern regarding fairness of free
elections as well as enabling states to place limitations on the senior
holders of public office to gain electoral advantage whilst still
connected with the prestige and powers of such offices.140
However, in an apparent U-turn, the Court has found violations
of Article 3 of Protocol 1 in the cases of Adamsons v. Latvia with
similar background.141 Some scholars have observed that the above
two cases indicate a narrowing of the gap between Article 11 and
Article 3 of Protocol 1 scrutiny.142 In Adamsons, the Latvian
government had disqualified a former low-ranking officer of the
KGB border guard from standing the 2002 general election.143 In a
departure from the previous approach, not only did the Court
consider the affiliation of this person’s involvement with the previous
regime but crucially considered his activities in the society since the
collapse of the Soviet Union which according to the Court:
The Court considered, in the light of the particular sociohistorical background to the applicant’s case that during the first
years after Latvia had regained independence, electoral rights could
be substantially restricted without thereby infringing Article 3 of
Protocol No. 1. However, with the passing of time, a more general
suspicion regarding a group of persons no longer sufficed and the
authorities had to provide further arguments and evidence to justify
the measure in question.144

138. Hamilton, “Transition, Political Loyalties and the Order of the State”, op. cit., p. 157.
139. Zdanoka v. Latvia, App. No. 58278/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006).
140. Mowbray, “the Role of the European Court of Human Rights in the Promotion of
Democracy”, op. cit., p. 708.
141. Adamsons v. Latvia, Appl. No. 3669/02, 24 June 2008. French text available only,
extract from Press release issued by the Registrar, p. 3. See also Varju, M., “Transition
as a Concept of European Human Rights Law”, European Human Rights Review 170
(2009).
142. Hamilton, “Transition, Political Loyalties and the Order of the State”, op. cit., p. 181.
143. Adamsons v. Latvia, App. No. 3669/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 3 (2008).
144. Adamsons v. Latvia, French text available only, extract from Press release issued by
the Registrar, p. 3.
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This approach has since been reiterated by the Court in the case
of and Tanase v Moldova in which the Court held that prevention of a
Moldovan citizen holding dual nationality from standing in for
election “some seventeen years after Moldova had gained
independence and five years after it had relaxed its laws to allow
dual-citizenship” was illegal.145
IV.G The Convention Rights and Political parties
As noted above, political parties are the very cornerstones of
European democracy and the Court considers pluralism as an
inseparable part of liberal democracy. In order to maintain political
debate political parties are the other crucial participants of a
pluralistic system of government. The court has opined that:
Such expression is inconceivable without the participation of a
plurality of political parties representing the different shades of
opinion to be found within a country’s population. By relaying this
range of opinion, not only within political institutions but also with
the help of media at all levels of social life, political parties make an
irreplaceable contribution to political debate, which is at the very
core of a democratic society.146
In the case of Socialist Party of Turkey v Turkey, the Court
emphasised on the importance of pluralism in a democratic society to
the extent that challenging existing national structure was acceptable
only through democratic means that “it is of the essence of
democracy to allow diverse political programmes to be proposed and
debated, even those that call into question the way a state is currently
organised, provided that they do not harm democracy itself.”147
Hence, constitutional reform even of fundamental nature is a
justifiable topic of political debate as long as the advocates are not
seeking to undermine the very foundation of the national democratic
system.148
In the early 1990s, one of the challenges for the Court’s
jurisprudence was presented with a series of cases involving closure
145. Tanase v Moldova (GC), Appl. No. 7/08, 27 April 2010, para. 159.
146. United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, Appl. No. 19392/92, 30
January 1998, para 44.
147. Socialist Party of Turkey v Turkey, (1998) 27 E.H.R.R. 51. at para 44.
148. Contrast with the early German Communist Party case: KDP v FRG (1957) No.
250/57 1 YB 222.
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of nine political parties in Turkey.149 In the first eight cases the
Court’s approach was very similar in its reasoning. The reason for
dissolution of these political parties was that they were all striving to
settle the Kurdish problem democratically and advocating a federal
state comprised of a Kurdish and a Turkish nation. The Court was of
the opinion that it could not justify a ban and while the states could
take measures to protect their institutions, a political party could not
be excluded from the protection of the Convention simply because
the activities of these political parties are regarded by the national
authorities as undermining the constitutional structure of the state.150
In the case of the United Communist party of Turkey and Others, the
Court held that the mere inclusion of the word “Communist” in the
name of the party could not justify dissolution of that party.151
Nonetheless, in contrast to the case of the German Communist
party, this party posed no threat to Turkish society, as it did not
pursue traditional communist aims.152 The Court was unanimous in
their conclusion regarding the aforementioned parties that since they
bore no responsibility for Kurdish terrorism, the dissolution violated
Article 11.153 However, in contrast to these cases, the seminal
exception was the Court’s now notorious decision in the case of
Refah Partisi v Turkey, in which the court upheld the decision of the
Turkish Supreme Court to ban an Islamist party.154 The coming to
prominence by the Refah Partisi in Turkey, very much reflected the
rise of an ‘Islamic resurgence’ at the end of the twentieth century.155
149. United communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, Appl. No.
133/1996/752/951, 30 January 1998; Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey, Appl. No.
20/1997/804/1007, 25 May 1998; Freedom and democracy Party (ÖZDEP) v. Turkey,
Appl. No. 23885/94, 12 August 1999; Yazar and Others and the People’s Labour Party
(HEP) v. Turkey, Appl. No. 22723/93, 9 April 2002; Dicle on Behalf of the Democracy
Party (DEP) v. Turkey, Appl. No. 25141/94, 10 December 2002; Socialist Party of
Turkey (STP) and Others v. Turkey, Appl. No. 26482/95, 12 November 2003; Democracy and Change Party and others v. Turkey, Appl. No. 39210/98 and 39974/98, 26
April 2005; Emek Partisi and Şenol v. Turkey, Appl. No. 39434/98, 31 May 2005.
150. United Communist Party, op. cit., para. 27.
151. United communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, para. 54.
152. Id. at para. 57.
153. Anagnostou et al., The European Court of Human Rights and the Rights of Marginalized Individuals and Minorities in National Context, op. cit., p. 176.
154. Refah Partisi v Turkey, [GC], Appl. No. 41340/98, 13 February 2003.
155. Esposito & Voll describe the rise of Islamic political movements as one of the “great
developments’ at the end of the twentieth century. Esposito, J & Voll, J., Islam and
Democracy, Oxford U.P., 1996, p. 202.
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In spite of its secular political system Turkey a predominantly Muslim state was not different from other Islamic countries experiencing
this sea change.156
The Court unanimously ruled that there was no violation of
article 11, a decision vehemently criticised by some prominent
scholars such as McGoldrick.157 This was mainly based on the fact
that the leaders of Refah had made public speeches advocating
imposition of Sharia law, which was considered irreconcilable with
the notion of liberal democracy, as conceived by the Convention.158
As Harvey puts it, “given that the party had over four million
members this amounts to the largest single interference with freedom
of association in European jurisprudence”.159
In Partidul Comunistilor (Nepeceristi) (PCN) and Ungureanu v.
Romania, the Court found a violation of Article 11 following the
refusal of the Bucharest Court of Appeal to register PCN as a
political party.160 Although PCN openly purported to be a MarxistLeninist organization, but very much distanced itself from the former
Romanian Communist Party that had ruled Romania during the Cold
War period. The Bucharest County Court held that PCN’s political
programme aimed at “establishing a humane state based on
communist doctrine, which would imply that the constitutional and

156. Refah Partisi was established in 1983, and soon experienced success in local and general elections. In the Turkish general election in December 1995, Refah Partisi obtained 22 per cent of the vote and was the biggest in the Grand National assembly. On
28 June 1996, it came to power as the senior partner in a coalition government and in
January 1997, an opinion poll suggested that it was likely to win 67 per cent of the
votes in the following general election to be held four years later. On 16 January 1998,
the Constitutional Court of Turkey ordered the dissolution of the party. See generally
Findley, C.V., Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: A History, Yale, U.P.,
2011; see also Zurcher, E.J., Turkey: A Modern History, 2004, I.B. Tauris,3rd Rev.
Ed., 2004.
157. McGoldrick, D., “Accommodating Muslims in Europe: From adopting Sharia Law to
religiously Based Opt out from Generally Applicable Laws”, Human Rights Law Review 9(4) (2009) 603-612.
158. Refah Partisi v Turkey, [GC], op. cit., para. 34.
159. Harvey, “Militant Democracy and the European Convention on Human Rights”, op.
cit., p. 417.
160. Partidul Comunistilor (Nepeceristi) (PCN) and Ungureanu v. Romania, Appl. No.
46626/99, 3 February 2005.
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legal order in place since 1989 is inhumane and not founded on genugenuine democracy.”161
The Court in Strasbourg rejected the Romanian government’s
argument that it could not permit “the emergence of a new
communist party to form the subject of democratic debate”, and
reiterated the importance of pluralism and political parties which
applied to all of the signatories to the Convention.162 The Court
stated that “political parties played an essential role in ensuring
pluralism and the proper functioning of democracy” as well as “there
can be no democracy without pluralism”163 Moreover, the Court held
that:
The Court is also prepared to take into account the historical
background to cases before it, in this instance Romania’s experience
of totalitarian communism prior to 1989. However, it observes that
that context cannot by itself justify the need for the interference,
especially as communist parties adhering to Marxist ideology exist in
a number of countries that are signatories to the Convention.164
The approach of the Court in the above case could be construed
as quite a departure from previous case-law regarding former
Communist Eastern European states. However, it should be pointed
out that PCN had made it absolutely clear that it accepted pluralism,
multiparty political system and had no affiliation with the former
Romanian Communist Party165 On the part of the Court, in the words
of Hamilton “the Court has demonstrated its resolve to foster a robust
and inclusive political sphere, underpinned by the values of pluralism
and social cohesion”.166 In this regard, the judgment of Herri
Batasuna and Batasuna v. Spain is of significance, in which the
Court held:
[I]t necessarily follows that a political party whose leaders incite
to violence or put forward a policy which fails to respect democracy
161. Article 20 of the PCN’s constitution stated that the PCN was ‘not the successor of the
former Romanian Communist Party’, ibid, para. 10.
162. Partidul Comunistilor (Nepeceristi) (PCN) and Ungureanu v. Romania, op. cit., para.
58.
163. Id. at para. 44.and para. 45.
164. Id. at para. 58.
165. The Court could see no calls for violence or anti-democratic statements in the Party’s
proposed constitution, Id. at 54; see also Sweeney, “The European Court of Human
Rights in the Post-Cold War Era: Universality in Transition”, op, cit., p. 198.
166. Hamilton, “Transition, Political Loyalties and the Order of the State”, op. cit., p. 181.
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or which is aimed at the destruction of democracy and the flouting of
the rights and freedoms recognised in a democracy cannot lay claim
to the Convention’s protection against penalties imposed on those
grounds . . . .167
Moreover, the Court attached a caveat to the above passage by noting that:

[A] State may “reasonably forestall the execution of such a
policy, which is incompatible with the Convention’s provisions,
before an attempt is made to implement it through concrete steps that
might prejudice civil peace and the country’s democratic regime.168
In the recent case of Vona v. Hungary, the Court was of the
opinion that the dissolution of the Hungarian Guard Association
(Magyar Garda) by domestic court was lawful restriction of the
applicant’s rights under Article 11 of the Convention.169 The said
organization had openly advocated a racist message against the
Romani population of Hungary. In the Court’s view:
[T]he State is entitled to take preventive measures to protect
democracy vis-à-vis such non-party entities as well, if a sufficiently
imminent prejudice to the rights of others undermines the
fundamental values upon which a democratic society rests and
functions. One of such values is the cohabitation of members of
society without racial segregation, without which a democratic
society is inconceivable.170
The Court found that the Hungarian authorities were entitled to
take preventive measures in order to protect democracy and proscribe
the organization due to its racist and divisive views.171 It is the
established case-law of the Strasbourg organs which have
consistently maintained that there are positive obligations to secure
the effective enjoyment of the rights contained in Article 11.172 Not
only everyone regardless of their status or background characteristics
(ethnicity, place of origin, religion, disability, etc.) are entitled to

167. Herri Batasuna and Batasuna v. Spain, Appl. No. 25803/04 and 25817/04, 30 June
2009, para. 79.
168. Id. at para. 81.
169. Vona v. Hungary, Appl. No. 35943/10, 9 July 2013.
170. Id. at para. 57; see also Refah Partisi v Turkey, [GC], op. cit., para. 102.
171. Id. at para. 58.
172. Christians against Racism and Fascism v. United Kingdom, Appl. No. 8440/78, 16
July 1980, 21 DR 138.
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effective enjoyment of these rights but the contracting states are ununder obligation to prevent and remedy any breach thereof.173
IV.H. Article 17 and the Court’s Jurisprudence
In the words of Pierre-Henri Teitgen, the French jurist who was
one of the driving forces behind the drafting of the Convention which
truly reflected the general post World War II perception that at
certain times, democracies need to defend themselves against the
threat of totalitarianism.174 Adoption of Article 17 of the Convention
which is prohibition on abuse of rights and to prevent totalitarian and
extremist groups from justifying their activities by relying on the
Convention encapsulates this approach.175 This is exactly what the
Court had to do in the early days of its existence. At this stage, it is
worth noting that the Court’s case-law regarding anti-democratic
actors since its establishment until recent decades was mainly limited
to Fascists and Communists applicants.176
It is clear that the main idea behind the first proposal for a
Convention was to provide human rights guarantees of a very basic
and fundamental nature as a reaction to the atrocities committed in
the World War II and the subsequent outbreak of the Cold war.177
173. Van Dijk, P. and Van Hoof, G.J.H., (eds.) Theory and Practice of European Convention on Human Rights, op. cit., p. 589.
174. Pierre-Henri Teitgen, delivering a speech before the consultative Assembly of Council
of Europe in September 1949, cited in Bates, E., The Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights, from İnception to the Creation of a Permanent Court of
Human Rights, Oxford U.P., 2010, p. 44.
175. ARTICLE 17, Prohibition of abuse of rights states: “Nothing in this Convention may
be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set
forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.”
176. In the early decades of the Convention, the European Commission upheld the banning
of the German Communist Party by West Germany, thereby extending the reach of Article 17 to allow a member state to enact measures to preclude democracy’s capacity to
surrender to communist rule. K.D.P v. Germany, 1 Y.B. Eur. Conv. H.R. 222 (Eur.
Comm’n on H.R.), See also X v. Austria, 26 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 244
(1982); Piperno v. Italy, App. No. 155510/89, 2 Dec 1992 (Commission Report).
177. Harvey notes that “without question the court’s analysis of these claims has been
through a cold war lens.” Harvey, P., “Militant democracy and the European Convention on Human Rights”, (2004) European Law Review, 29(3), p. 413. See also Wildhaber, L., “Changing Ideas about the Tasks of the European Court of Human Rights”,
in Wildhaber, L., The European Court of human Rights 1998-2006: History,
Achievements and Reform, (Kehl, Strasbourg, Arlington: N.P. Engel), 2006, pp. 136-
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The court maintains a consistent approach of refusing to consider any
applications in relation to fascist and racist group from any member
states.178
Indeed, all such cases have been refused as inadmissible either
as manifestly ill-founded or removed from the protection of the
Convention on the basis of Article 17, which covers a variety of
activities on the far right of political spectrum, such as distributing
racist and fascist pamphlets, and denial of the Holocaust.179 It also
discusses organising paramilitary training camps, denial of the
Austrian state by advocating a Pan-Germanic nation, and attempts to
revive the Fascist party in Italy.180
However, the only possible exception to the jurisprudence of the
court in that period was the case of Lehideux and Isorni v. France,
which concerned a criminal conviction on the basis of a newspaper
article in praise of Marshall Petain (who headed the collaborationist
Vichy regime during the Nazi occupation of France), in which the
court found a violation of Art.10.181 It went on to say that Art.17
would remove the use of Art.10 to negate the Holocaust from
protection of Art.10 but since the article had not done so, therefore,
Art.17 was not applicable.182 Judge Jambrek in his concurring
opinion elaborated on conditions in which Article 17 would be
applicable since:
The aim of the offending actions must be to spread violence or
hatred, to resort to illegal or undemocratic methods, to encourage the
use of violence, to undermine the nation’s democratic and pluralist
political system, or to pursue objectives that are racist or likely to
destroy the rights and freedom of others.183

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

138; See generally Bates, the Evolution of the European Convention of the European
Convention of Human rights, op. cit., pp. 1-29.
Jersild v Denmark, E.C.H.R., 23 September 1994, Series A, no. 298.
Kuhnen v. Germany (1998) 56 D.R. 205; App. No. 12774/78 & 8406/78, Glimmerveen and Hagenback v. Netherlands (1978) 18 D.R. 187.Garaudy v. France [admissibility], 24.06.03.App. No.65831/01.
Schimanek v. Austria, Dec. 1.2.00. App. No.32307/96; see Association A. and H v.
Austria (1984) 36 D.R. 187, App. No.9905/82; see X v. Italy (1975) 5 D.R. 833, App.
No.6741/74.
Lehideux and Isorni v. France (2000) 30 E.H.R.R. 665.
Id. at para 47.
Concurring opinion of Judge Jambrek at para 2.
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He was of the opinion that the best way to oppose the rise of ananti-Semitism in Europe was “free critique” in which democracies,
unlike dictatorships, can cope with the sharpest controversies.”184 In
relation to applicability of Article 17, he noted that “on the other
hand the requirements of Article 17 also reflect concern for the
defense of democratic society and its institution.”185 In contrast, the
Court has adopted a much more ambivalent attitude towards political
movements on the left side of the political spectrum.186 Although the
Court after the end of the Cold War adopted a more tolerant and
measured approach towards left-wing political movements.187
V. Conclusion
The concept of a ‘democratic society’ encompasses the entire
framework of the Convention and serves as a criterion for the
assessment of legality of state action. The Convention entails a broad
protection of the substantive rights that are said to be easily
identified.188 As it has been observed, the Court has derived its
concept of democracy from the components of the contemporary
model of democracy in Europe from its origin, preamble and text of
the Convention. Indeed the drafters of the European Convention on
Human rights adopted the notion of liberal democracy and pluralism
as the very corner stone of the Convention.189
In that regard, the Court considers liberal democracy as the only
guarantee for fundamental freedom and human rights. The cases that
this paper has analysed certainly reveal the Court’s adherence to
representative democracy and free elections as well as the importance
of transparency and accountability in public and political spheres.
Along with reference to a ‘democratic society’ in relation to the
qualification of rights, the substantive contents of Articles 10, 11 of
the Convention and Article 3, Protocol I, combined provide a
184. Id. at para. 2.
185. Id. at para. 3.
186. The Communist Party (KPD) v. Germany, 20 July 1957 1Y.B. 222, EComHR;
Glasenapp v Germany, (A/104) (1987) 9 E.H.R.R. 25; Kosiek v. Germany, app. No.
9704/82, 28 August 1986.
187. Vogt v Germany, App. No. 17851/91, 26 September 1995, 21 E.H.R.R. 205, paras. 28,
30, 31.
188. Id. ¶ 52.
189. Id.
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democratic backbone to the Convention system.190 These are the
rights to free expression, free assembly and association, and the right
to free elections.
In recent decades, the Court has recognised Article 9 of the
Convention as “one of the foundations of a democratic society within
the meaning of the Convention.” However, the abovementioned
rights are not absolute and are subject to limitations set out in the
second part of these articles. The restrictions must be prescribed by
law and be necessary in a democratic society in the interest of public
safety, for the protection public order, health morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Furthermore, through the doctrine of “margin of appreciation”
allows the member states certain discretion to interfere with or limit
human rights in specific instances. This “margin of appreciation”,
however, is increasingly subject to oversight by the Court in order to
ensure objective compliance with the protected rights. This approach
is increasingly adopted by the Court in cases concerning transitional
democracies in former Communist totalitarian systems.
This paper has shown that since the collapse of the Soviet Union
and accession of all of the former European communist states to the
Council of Europe the Court has faced a huge challenge in upholding
and enforcing the values of democracy, since most of these states
were new to the notion of liberal democracy. This led to the
emergence of new kind of applicant bringing litigation against new
states defending those cases.
This new challenge has prompted the court to reiterate and
articulate a coherent normative conception of democracy even though
that conception is bound to be contested. As a result, democracy in
the context of the Convention cannot be understood merely in a
formal sense as majority rule. Democracy must primarily be
understood as participatory democracy, with respect for different
opinion and belief, and focused on freedom of expression as a means
of ensuring active involvement of the people in the decision-making
processes.
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